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ABSTRACT
I model the interaction between a regulator and polluting firms as a Stackelberg
differential game in which the regulator leads.  The firms create pollution, which results in a stock
externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures in a
competitive industry.  The principal issue here concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal
solution.  Inter alia, I compare the steady state levels of pollution under optimal and under time
consistent policies. 
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CONSISTENCY AND OPTIMALITY IN A DYNAMIC GAME
OF POLLUTION CONTROL I:  COMPETITION
1.  Introduction
1
In environmental economics, until very recently, most analyses of the regulation of
externality generating firms have been conducted in a static context.  In such a context, the
externality problem is typically solved by setting a corrective tax equal in magnitude to the
marginal social damage caused by the externality being regulated.  This “Pigouvian” approach
has a long history—see Meade (1952), Newbery (1980), and Cropper and Oates (1992)—and the
Pigouvian tradition is well established in environmental economics.  Unfortunately, however, this
tradition ignores a fundamental aspect of most contemporary regulatory settings, namely, the
interaction between the regulator and the regulated firm over time.  Indeed, time is a key element
in the analysis of regulatory problems in environmental economics.  This means that any
reasonable analysis of environmental regulation must explicitly account for four features which
are germane owing to the dynamic nature of the underlying problem.  The first feature concerns
the inherent conflict in the objectives of the regulating agent and the regulated agent.  The second
feature pertains to the ongoing nature of the interaction between the regulator and the regulated
party.  Third, the question of the dynamic effects of alternate regulatory instruments is relevant.
Finally, because the interaction between the regulator and the regulated party is ongoing, the
parties in the interaction are forward looking, i.e., the future affects the present.  Thus, analyses
of environmental regulation in such a context must address the problem of dynamic inconsistency2
See Batabyal (1995a, pp. 33-37) for a sampling of papers which involve some study of dynamics, although
2
not of dynamic inconsistency. 
The modern literature on prices versus quantities begins with Weitzman (1974).  See Batabyal (1995a) for
3
a recent survey of many of the important issues in this literature. 
In this paper, competitive means price taking. 
4
A companion paper, Batabyal (1995b), focuses on the monopolistic industry case. 
5
of adopted regulatory policies.  While the significance of the first feature is generally well
understood, analyses of environmental regulatory problems, which explicitly incorporate all four
of the above features, have been few and far between.
2
Given this state of affairs, in this paper I study environmental regulation in a dynamic
context, explicitly incorporating in my analysis, all four features mentioned in the above
paragraph.  An important part of my analysis will consist of studying the effects of alternate price
control instruments.  While there exists a substantial literature on the effects of price versus
quantity control instruments, there has been almost no research on the comparative properties of
alternate price control measures.  In focusing on prices versus prices, I hope to extend the vast
extant literature on prices versus quantities.  
3
I model the interaction between a regulator and a competitive,  polluting industry as a
4
deterministic Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads.   The differential game
5
incorporates two important aspects of the regulator/polluter interaction:  first, it explicitly
considers the dynamic nature of the interaction; and, second, it recognizes that the game being
played by the parties at each instance in time is different owing to the evolution of the state. 
The first strand of the analysis in this paper considers dynamically inconsistent policies
in a game in which the state, i.e., the stock of pollution, evolves in a manner known to all the3
This kind of objective is fairly standard in environmental economics.  See van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw
6
(1992, p. 121) for a similar objective. 
players.  A single regulatory regime and two kinds of price control instruments are considered.
In every case analyzed, the production of a certain good causes pollution.  The informational
costs of taxing pollution directly are assumed to be prohibitive.  Further, in setting policy, the
regulator is constrained by the dynamic optimizing behavior of the polluting firms.  As such, the
regulator taxes the production of the polluting good.  The regulator's objective is to maximize the
sum of net benefit and tax revenues.   The two kinds of policies available to the regulator include
6
a unit tax and an ad valorem tax.  In comparison with a unit tax, an ad valorem tax often results
in different:  (a) levels of revenue, and (b) welfare effects.  Further, depending on the industry
structure, these two taxes can have very different effects.  For these reasons, I have chosen to
analyze the dynamic effects of these two policy instruments.  This analysis will involve a
comparison of the outcomes of the different games resulting from the use of these two
price-control instruments. 
As I shall show, an important part of this comparative exercise will turn on the
intertemporal consistency of the policies employed by the regulator.  Further, practical
considerations may favor the use of ad valorem taxes over unit taxes.  Finally, the efficacy of
regulatory action will depend fundamentally on whether firm production costs are related to the
stock of pollution. 
In what follows, section 2 describes the Stackelberg differential game.  Section 3 derives
and compares the various open loop policies.  In section 4, I derive dynamically consistentP(q)
P (q) < 0 ,
c(x)
x(t). c(x)q
c (x) > 0 , c (x) > 0 , c(0) 0 .
u a
4
policies and compare them to the open loop policies of section 3.  Section 5 offers concluding
comments and discusses directions for future research. 
2.  The Stackelberg Differential Game
My model is a variant of one studied by Karp (1984).  I shall work with a representative
firm which maximizes profits.    is the twice differentiable inverse demand function faced
by the firm.  I assume that   where q is the production rate of the firm.  I shall think
of the firm as facing two kinds of costs associated with production at rate q.  The first kind of cost
depends on the current stock of pollution.  Only a portion of this cost is assumed to be
internalized by the firm.  As an example of such stock-dependent costs, consider the case of
groundwater-based irrigation farming in the San Joaquin Valley of California.  Since groundwater
is used for irrigation, the cost of farming for any single farmer depends on the pumping activities
of other farmers.  That is, a single farmer's cost depends on the stock of groundwater.  Let 
be the internalized average cost of producing one unit of output at time t when the stock of
pollution is    Then   represents the instantaneous, internalized, pollution dependent cost
of producing at rate q.  I assume that   and that    This
stock-dependent cost function is very important, and its properties will have a profound bearing
on virtually all my subsequent results. 
The second kind of cost is independent of the level of pollution.  Let w denote the constant
marginal cost of producing at rate q; thus, wq represents the pollution-independent cost of
producing at rate q.  Let   and   denote the unit and the ad valorem tax, respectively.  TheJF
0
e rt{P(q)q wq uq c(x)q}dt .
JF
0
e rt{ aP(q)q wq c(x)q}dt ,
a 1/(1 a).
t x(t). D( )
B (q) > 0 , B (q) < 0 , D (x) > 0 , D (x) > 0 .
JR
0
e rt{B(q) u q D(x)}dt .
JR
0
e rt{B(q) (1 a)P(q)q D(x)}dt .
u(t) a(t)
5
Also see van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992, p. 121). 
7
firm's payoff in an infinite horizon game in which the regulator uses a unit tax and where r
denotes the interest rate is 
(1)
When the regulator uses an ad valorem tax, the corresponding firm payoff is
(2)
where   
There are three components to the regulator's payoff.  A twice differentiable function B(q)
represents social benefit from production at rate q.  D(x) is a differentiable function which
measures the damage from pollution.  In other words, firms create pollution; the level of this
pollution at time   is    The function   maps this pollution to a measure of environmental
damage for society.   I assume that   and that 
7
When the regulator uses a unit tax to control pollution, his payoff is 
(3)
When he uses an ad valorem tax, his payoff is 
(4)
The regulator controls   and   and the firm controls q(t). As the leader, the
regulator announces a time path for the tax which the firm treats parametrically. Both the
regulator and the firm are constrained by the evolution of the stock of pollution which is given
byx q(t) f(x), f(x)
f(x) 0.
dx/dt x q(t) ,
x(0) x0 > 0
x1 < x2 , xi , i 1,2
i, i 1,2 .
q1 < q2 , qi , i 1,2
i, i 1,2 .
q(t)
6
A more general state equation of the type   where   is the “regenerative capacity” of the
8
environment, complicates the analysis in two ways.  First, the method used in section 4 to obtain dynamicall y
consistent policies fails when the state equation has this additional term.  Second, other methods of obtainin g
dynamically consistent policies, such as the method used in Karp (1991), result in multiple equilibria.  Sinc e
equilibrium selection is not the principal focus of this paper, I have imposed a uniqueness requirement on the
equilibrium under study; this requirement is    The imposition of this uniqueness requirement on the above
state equation yields (5). 
(5)
where   is given.  Equation (5) tells us that the evolution of the stock of pollution
is a function of the flow of output.  The environment is assumed to be unable to regenerate itself.
8
Depending on the policy employed by the regulator, different levels of steady state
pollution emerge.  One can think of these levels as the outcomes of different games.  One way
of comparing these outcomes is to compare the levels of output and pollution.  In this connection,
I shall say that game 1 results in less pollution than game 2 iff   where   is
the steady state level of pollution in game    Similarly, I shall say that game 1 results
in less output than game 2 iff   where   is the steady state level of output in
game    I can compare the different trajectories of output by deriving a differential
equation which the equilibrium   in each game must satisfy.  When I am able to compare the
trajectories of output without resorting to additional assumptions, I shall do so.  Typically though,
all my comparisons of pollution and output levels will take place in the steady state.  In many
cases it will not be possible to obtain general results. In such cases the analysis concentrates on
special functional forms. 7
3.  The Competitive Industry and Open Loop Taxes
In this section I shall derive the optimal open loop unit and ad valorem taxes for the
regulatory objectives discussed above.  In the class of Stackelberg games considered in this
paper, these taxes are dynamically inconsistent except when the pollution dependent cost function
is constant.  In other words, if the stock dependent cost function is not constant and the regulator
is able—at some time t > 0—to alter the time path of taxes he committed to at t = 0, he would
choose to do so.  This means that open loop taxes will fail to achieve their policy objectives
because a regulator who uses such taxes will not be deemed credible by polluting firms.  This is
an extremely important fact, and I shall have more to say about dynamic consistency in section
4. 
3.1  The Open Loop Unit Tax
I shall solve the regulator's problem using a method due to Chen and Cruz (1972) and
Simaan and Cruz (1973a, 1973b).  This method solves the regulator's problem when this problem
has one control and one state variable.  The method shows the dependence of the obtained
solution on the initial condition and hence the dynamic inconsistency of this solution.  The basic
idea is as follows.  The regulator treats the firm's first order condition as an ordinary constraint
and the firm's costate variable as a state variable.  These two conditions along with the
requirement that the optimal solution converge to a steady state converts the differential game
into a control problem for the regulator.  I now illustrate the use of this method. 
The first-order necessary conditions for the firm's problem, when the firm treats  (t) as u
















For more on jump state constraints, see Karp and Newbery (1993). 
9
If this condition does not hold, the present method of obtaining open loop controls fails, and alternat e
10




where  (t) is the costate variable.  The reader should note that (7) represents a jump state
constraint.   That is, the initial value of  ,  (0) is free and the value of this jump state variable at
9
any arbitrary point in time is determined by current and/or future events.  In other words, (7) is
not a fixed initial state constraint for the regulator.  This makes the regulator's problem a
nonstandard control problem. Solving for   from (6) and substituting in (3), I get  u
(8)
Equation (8) gives the regulator's payoff as the present discounted stream of benefits and
revenues less the sum of costs, pollution damage, and  q.  Since   is the shadow value of the
stock of pollution to the firm,  q is the firm's implicit value of polluted air gained by production
at rate q. I now want to eliminate   from (8) by using (7). Integrating (7) and assuming that  ( )
is finite,  I get
10
(9)






e rtc (x)q(t){x0 x(t)}dt.
JR
0
e rt[B(q) P(q)q wq c(x)q c (x)q{x0 x(t)} D(x)]dt .
B (q) P (q)q P(q) w c(x) c (x){x0 x(t)} 0 ,
(t) r 2c (x)q D (x) qc (x){x0 x(t)} ,
9
Now reversing the order of integration of the last integral in (10), I get
(11)
Using (11), I can now write (10) as 
(12)
I have now converted the regulator's problem from one of maximizing (3) over   subject to (5) u





where  (t) is the costate variable.  Equation (13) tells us that the solution to the regulator's
problem depends on the initial stock of pollution, x .  Further, (13) also tells us that if the 0
regulator were able to alter his announced time path for the unit tax at any time  (0,  ), then x0
in (13) would have to be replaced with x( ).  As such, the ensuing solution   >   would not be t
(13).  Hence, this solution is dynamically inconsistent.  Before deriving a differential equation
which the optimal q(t) satisfies, a comment on the significance of (7) is in order.  The reader
should note that (7) acts as a rational expectations constraint for the regulator.  The rational
expectations nature of this constraint stems from the fact that the firm's problem in this
Stackelberg game is dynamic. {B (q) P (q)q 2P (q)}q r{w c(x) B (q) P(q) P (q)q c (x)(x0 x)} D (x) 0,
u P(q) {w c(x)}.
u r u {P (q)}q r{P(q) w c(x)} ,




P (q)q > r{P(q) w c(x)} .
10
* denotes a steady state value. 
11
To find the differential equation which is satisfied by the optimal q(t) with the imposition
of the unit tax, I shall differentiate (13) w.r.t. time and then use (14) for simplification.  I get 
(15)
where q* = 0 is the boundary condition for q.   From (15) we see that the open loop unit tax is
11
dynamically consistent iff the pollution dependent cost function is constant.  When this stock
dependent cost function is constant, three results follow.  First, the reason for the inconsistency,
i.e., the dependence of the solution on the initial condition, disappears.  Second, (7) implies that
(t)   0.  Third, (6) tells us that the optimal unit tax is now given by the price less the sum of the
wage and the average pollution dependent cost, i.e.,   
To find the equation for the optimal open loop unit tax, I shall differentiate (6) w.r.t. time.
I get 
(16)
where    In (16),   is given by (15).  x* can be obtained as indicated in section
3.3 below.  Let   denote the present value of the unit tax.  Substituting   from (15) into
(16), we see that the present value of the unit tax is increasing as long as
 
3.2  The Open Loop Ad Valorem Tax
I can now derive the solution for the open loop ad valorem tax with the regulatory
objective described in section 2. aP(q) w c(x) (t) 0 ,
JR
0
e rt{B(q) P(q)q wq c(x)q D(x) q}dt .
P(q) u
aP(q). P(q) u aP(q) w c(x) (t) .
D (x )/r,
B (0) P(0) w c(x ) {D (x )/r} c (x )(x0 x ) 0 .
c (x) 0.
11
To maximize (2) subject to (5), I form the firm's current value Hamiltonian.  The resulting
first-order necessary conditions are 
(17)
and (7).  Solving for   from (17), substituting in (4), and simplifying the resulting expression, a
I get 
(18)
At this time, a comparison of (8) and (18) is in order.  Note that the regulator's payoff is policy
invariant.  Further, the constraint in both cases is (5).  Thus, we can conclude that the optimal unit
and ad valorem taxes are equivalent, and, hence, they will both give rise to the same time profile
of output and pollution.  The firm's price with the unit tax is   and with the ad valorem
tax it is    It is easy to verify that   
3.3  Analysis
Denoting steady state values by "*", (5) tells us that q  = 0, (14) tells us that
*
 and (7) tells us that   = 0.  Using these values for q ,  ,  , in (13), I find that the
* * * *
steady state level of pollution, x  solves 
*
(19)
Observe that x  is always dependent on x  as long as    That is, in an optimal program, if
*
0
the stock-dependent cost function is nonconstant, then the steady state level of pollution is a
function of the initial level of pollution.  I can now state (t) 0, a(0) [{c(x0) w (0)}/P{q(0)}] > 0 ,
a [{w c(x )}/P(0)] > 0 .
u(0) > 0 u > 0 .
t (0, )
12
Recall that     0.  So keeping   high means keeping it low in absolute value. 
12
Proposition 1:  The optimal open loop unit and ad valorem taxes are both positive at t = 0 and
at t =   as long as P( )   0. 
Proof:  Using   I can write   and
 In this last expression, x  is given by (19).  Further, since the unit
*
tax and the ad valorem tax are equivalent, I have   and 
Proposition 1 tells us that when the regulator uses policies which display perfect
commitment on his part, an optimal program involves setting positive taxes at the beginning and
at the end of the game.  At the beginning of the game, the regulator knows that he will be able
to use the tax trajectory to affect the firm's future behavior.  One way to affect the firm's future
behavior is to promise that future taxes will be low as long as current pollution is low.  This
means that the regulator would like to keep the firm's shadow value of pollution,  , high in the
beginning of the game.   However, as (13) and (15) showed us, at some t > 0, the regulator
12
would like to deviate from his announced policy trajectory at t = 0 and decrease the valuation of
pollution by the firm.  One way to do this is to set higher taxes than those announced at the
beginning of the game.  Further, inspection of (6) and (17) tells us that in general—for any
—it is not optimal to set zero taxes. 
Since the optimal unit and ad valorem taxes are equivalent in a competitive industry, a
comparative exercise is not relevant.  I state the following general result which is of some
interest, especially when compared with the corresponding result for a monopolistic industry,
contained in Batabyal (1995b). 
Proposition 2:  When the regulator uses both taxes simultaneously, one is redundant. u 0 a 0 .
13
This method is essentially identical to a “loss of leadership” method proposed by W. Buiter.  For mor e
13
details, see Buiter (1989) and the references cited therein. 
Proof (Outline):  This follows from the fact that in a competitive market, the two taxes are
equivalent. 
Proposition 2 tells us that when the regulator chooses to use both taxes simultaneously,
it is optimal for him to set either   or    I now discuss the implications of using
dynamically consistent taxes when the underlying market structure is competitive. 
4.  The Competitive Industry and Dynamically Consistent Taxes
I begin with a brief synopsis of dynamically consistent policies.  The problem with
inconsistent policies, i.e., open loop policies, is that such policies are not credible.  In other
words, forward-looking firms will recognize that at t = 0, the regulator will set a policy trajectory
from which he will later want to deviate.  Thus, such a policy trajectory will not be believed by
firms, and, hence, the original policy will fail to achieve its objectives.  This lack of credibility
of open loop policies provides a rationale for the study of dynamically consistent policies. 
I shall obtain consistent controls by using a method employed in Karp (1984, pp. 87-88).
13
While other methods—see Karp (1991)—for obtaining consistent controls do exist, there are two
basic advantages to the Karp (1984) method.  First, it makes the logic of the solution transparent.
Second, this method facilitates the comparison of results obtained in section 3 with the results to
be derived in this section.  The basic idea of Karp's procedure is as follows.  In a Stackelberg
game, it must be possible to use the follower's first-order condition to eliminate the leader'sJR maxq(t)
0
[e rt{g(q,x)} hq(t) (t)]dt , h ,
x q(t) , x(0) x0 > 0 ,











where g(q, x), in my case, is a linear combination of the derivatives of the benefit, damage,
inverse demand, and stock dependent cost functions, one can obtain consistent controls by using
Theorem 1:  When the leader's problem has the form given by (20)-(22), dynamically consistent
controls can be found by solving 
(23)
subject to (21).  Theorem 1 can be proved as in Karp (1984, pp. 94-96).  Note that while the proof
requires that the function multiplying the follower's costate variable be linear in the leader's
control, the proof does not depend on h or the follower's costate variable being nonnegative. 
Put differently, in the class of problems that can be stated as (20)-(22), the leader obtains
dynamically consistent controls by disregarding the effect that the follower's marginal value of
the state has on his own payoff.  The logical basis of this procedure is as follows.  One way to
eliminate the inconsistency of the open loop solutions of section 3 lies in eliminating the term
which makes the solution dependent on x   This can be done in two ways.  The first approach is 0
to posit that the pollution-dependent cost function is constant.  Then   and the source of
the inconsistency disappears.  However, this is a strong and, a priori, unrealistic restriction.  The(x0 x)
x0 (x0 x) x(t). (x0 x)
maxq(t)[
0







second approach lies in making   vanish.  This is exactly what the above described
procedure does “. . . by treating the [regulator's] problem as [a] sequence of short open loop
problems, which in the limit becomes an infinite sequence of static optimization problems” (Karp,
1982, p. 117). 
Intuitively, we can think of a regulator who revises his tax policy whenever air quality
declines by some predetermined amount.  The idea is to let this predetermined amount and,
hence, the time interval between successive revisions approach zero.  When the regulator does
not commit to a specific tax trajectory at the beginning of the game but continuously revises his
tax policy,   in   must be replaced by    When this is done,   vanishes and the
resulting solution is dynamically consistent. 
It should be noted that dynamically consistent controls always result in a lower payoff to
the leader than do open loop controls except when the two kinds of controls coincide.  This stems
from the fact that forcing the controls to satisfy the principle of optimality completely eliminates
any gain accruing to the leader from setting policy once at the beginning of the game.  Alternately
put, when the leader uses consistent controls, his “. . . period of commitment [shrinks] to
zero . . .” (Buiter, 1989, p. 244).  In a manner analogous to Karp (1984, p. 88). the claim in this
paragraph can be verified formally by observing that 
(24)
where   and   are the optimized values of the output rate and the follower's marginal value of
the state which arise from the solution to the maximization problem on the RHS of (24).  The
constraints for both problems are the same and are given by (21) and (22).  Equality in (24) holdsˆ 0 ,
maxq(t)
0
e rt{B(q) P(q)q wq c(x)q D(x)}dt ,
B (q) P (q)q P(q) w c(x) 0 ,
r c (x)q D (x) ,
{B (q) P (q)q 2P (q)}q r{w c(x) B (q) P (q)q P(q)} D (x) 0 ,
aP(q) w c(x) (t) .
maxq(t)
0
e rt{B(q) P(q)q wq c(x)q D(x)}dt .
16
iff   a condition which holds when the pollution-dependent cost function is constant.
When this last condition holds, the open loop and the dynamically consistent controls coincide.
I now obtain dynamically consistent controls, in turn, when the regulator uses a unit tax and then
when the regulator uses an ad valorem tax. 
4.1  The Dynamically Consistent Unit Tax
When the regulator uses an unit tax, his problem is to solve 
(25)




where   is the costate variable associated with (5).  The maximizing rate of output solves 
(28)
with boundary condition q  = 0. 
*
4.2  The Dynamically Consistent Ad Valorem Tax
The solution for the consistent ad valorem tax can be obtained in an analogous manner.
The firm's first-order necessary condition is 
(29)
The regulator's problem now is to solve
(30)B (0) P(0) w c(x ) D (x )/r 0 .
c (x) 0,
B(q) q (1/2)q 2, D(x) (1/2) x 2, P(q) a bq, c(x) 1x
>w,
1x0/{2 1 /r} <(>) [[{ a w}/{ 1 /r}] [{ a w}/{2 1 /r}]] .
17
As in section 3, I note that (25) and (30) are identical; in both problems, the constraint is (5).  I
conclude that in a competitive industry, the consistent unit and ad valorem taxes are equivalent.
The maximizing rate of output—when the regulator uses an ad valorem tax—solves (28).  Using
(26) and the relevant steady state values, I find that the steady state level of pollution, x  solves
*
(31)
A comparison of (31) with (19) reveals the essential differences in x  stemming from the use of
*
the consistent tax as opposed to the open loop tax. 
4.3  Analysis
I can now compare the steady state pollution and output effects of the two policy
instruments.  Recall that d  = 0 in every case.  I shall first compare the open loop policies with
*
the dynamically consistent policies. 
The results of this comparative exercise are summarized in Table 1.  The two equations
that I shall use to compare the pollution levels with the open loop unit tax and with the
dynamically consistent unit tax are (19) and (31).  The subsequent analysis concentrates on
special functional forms.  If the relevant functions in (19) and (31) are arbitrary but   then
a comparison of (19) and (31) tells us that the open loop unit tax and the dynamically consistent
unit tax both give rise to the same level of pollution.  Using
 in (19) and (31) and assuming that
  I find that the open loop unit tax leads to a lower (higher) level of pollution as compared
to the dynamically consistent unit tax depending on whether
  Now considerB(q) q (1/2)q 2 , D(x) x , P(q) a bq , c(x) 1x . ( a) > {w ( /r)} ,
1x0/2 1 <(>) [[{ a w ( /r)}/ 1] [{ a w ( /r)}/2 1]] .
B(q) q (1/2)q 2 , D(x) x , P(q) q , (0,1) , c(x) 1x
> {w ( /r)} .
1x0/2 1 <(>) [[{ w ( /r)}/ 1] [{ w ( /r)}/2 1]] .
a 1 1 , x0 10 , w 4 , 5 ,
1 4 .
a 1 1 , x0 3 , w 4 , 100 ,
18
  If   then,
as compared to the consistent unit tax, the open loop unit tax leads to a lower (higher) level of
pollution as    Finally,
consider   and let
  Then as opposed to the consistent unit tax, the open loop unit tax leads to a
lower (higher) level of pollution as 
Inspection of (19) and (31) tells us that the effects of these two taxes essentially depend on the
properties of the pollution-dependent cost function.  The other functions affect both the equations
in a similar manner.  A comparison of the open loop ad valorem tax and the dynamically
consistent ad valorem tax is not germane since these two taxes are equivalent, in turn, to the open
loop unit tax and the dynamically consistent unit tax. 
I shall now use Table 1 and specific parameter values to:  (a) illustrate the analysis of the
previous paragraph, and (b) determine whether the consistent unit tax always leads to a higher
steady state pollution.  Consider the functional forms in the first row of Table 1.  When
 and r = 5%, we see that, as compared to the
consistent unit tax, the open loop unit tax leads to higher steady state pollution.  Holding fixed
the values of the other parameters, let us increase the magnitude of the cost and damage
parameters to    Once again the open loop unit tax leads to higher steady state
pollution.  Now consider an altered configuration of parameters.  Let
 and let r = 5%.  We see that when the benefit
parameter is relatively high and the initial level of pollution relatively low, the            B(q) q (1/2)q 2,
D(x) (1/2) x 2
P(q) a bq, c(x) 1x
>w
1x0/{2 1 /r}<
[[{ a w}/{ 1 /r}]
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Table 1
Steady State Pollution Effects of the Open Loop Unit Tax versus the 
Dynamically Consistent Unit Tax
Functional Forms Restrictions on Parameters Open Loop Unit Tax
 and Lower Pollution
 and Lower Pollution
 and Lower pollutiona 1 1 , x0 10 , w 4 , 90 ,
1 4 ,
1 1 , x0 10 , w 4 , 90 ,
1 4 ,
D (x) > 0 .
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This result does not hold in models with state equations more complicated than (5). 
14
consistent unit tax leads to higher steady state pollution.  Next consider the functional forms in
the second row of Table 1.  Let   and let r = 5%.
Now the consistent unit tax leads to higher steady state pollution.  However, when we keep the
other parameter values fixed and increase the cost and damage parameters to   we
see that now it is the open loop unit tax which results in higher steady state pollution.  Finally,
consider the functional forms in the third row of Table 1.  Let
 and let r = 5%.  In this case, the consistent unit tax
leads to higher steady state pollution.  However, when we leave the values of the other
parameters unchanged and increase the cost and damage parameters to   we find that
on this occasion it is the open loop unit tax which results in higher steady state pollution.  This
analysis demonstrates that the consistent unit tax does not always lead to higher steady state
pollution.  Indeed, there are parametric configurations for which the consistent unit tax actually
leads to lower steady state pollution. 
The analysis of this section tells us that the regulator's payoff is lower with continuous
policy revision; further, there exist circumstances in which the use of dynamically consistent
taxes leads to a higher level of pollution.  As compared to the open loop tax, the higher pollution
implies a higher level of social damage because    On the other hand q  = 0 in all the
*
cases analyzed.  Thus, higher pollution implies lower social welfare—as embodied in the
regulator's objective functional—in the steady state.   While the use of other functional forms
14
also leads to interpretable results, the analysis of this section suffices to demonstrate the
























B(q) q (1/2)q 2 , D(x) x , c(x) 1x , P(q) a bq








a ( 1x0/2 1) <(>) [[{ a w ( /r)}/ 1] [{ a w ( /r)}/2 1]] .
B(q) q (1/2)q 2 , D(x) x , c(x) 1x , P(q) q , (0 , 1) .








a ( 1x0/2 1) <(>)
[[{ w ( /r)}/ 1] [{ w ( /r)}/2 1]] .
21
In a monopolistic industry, this equivalence breaks down.  See Batabyal (1995b) for details. 
15
In a competitive market, owing to the equivalence of the consistent unit and ad valorem
taxes, we see the same time profile for output and pollution.  As such, a comparative exercise is
not necessary.  
15
My next task in this section is to rank the steady state pollution levels with all four taxes.
Table 2 summarizes the results of this paragraph.  In the rest of this paragraph, a > b means that
a leads to a higher level of pollution than does b, and a   b means that a and b both give rise to
the same level of pollution.  Denote the open loop unit tax, the open loop ad valorem tax, the
dynamically consistent unit tax, and the dynamically consistent ad valorem tax by 
and   respectively.  Recall that in a competitive industry,   and   hold.  Let 
 Then using this functional form and comparing (19) and (31), we see that
 holds.  Using
 in (19) and (31) and assuming
that   we conclude that   as   
 Next, let    and let    If
 then   as 
  This analysis once again clearly brings out
the sensitivity of the qualitative results to the choice of functional form and in particular to the
properties of the stock dependent cost function. 
I close this section by asking at what level the two taxes should be set when the regulator
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Proposition 3:  When the industry is competitive and the regulator uses both taxes
simultaneously, one of the two taxes is redundant. 
Proof (Outline):  This follows from the fact that in a competitive industry, the two taxes are
equivalent.  
The reader will note that while continuous revision of the tax by the regulator alters the
solution to his optimization problem, it does not alter his optimal course of action when he
chooses to use both taxes simultaneously. 
5.  Conclusions
In this paper I formulated and analyzed the interaction between polluting firms and a
regulator as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads.  I analyzed the impact
of unit and ad valorem taxes in a competitive industry.  Specifically, I derived open loop and
dynamically consistent policies for the regulator.  I illustrated the dynamic inconsistency of open
loop policies, and I pointed out the equivalence of open loop and consistent policies when
production costs are unrelated to the stock of pollution.  Further, I demonstrated the equivalence
of the unit tax and the ad valorem tax in a competitive market. 
By means of numerous steady state examples, I showed how one might interpret the
general results, and then I ranked the four taxes in terms of their ability to control pollution.
These examples demonstrate the sensitivity of the qualitative results to:  (a) the choice of
functional forms for inverse demand and stock dependent costs, and (b) the nature of the taxes.
Four main policy conclusions follow from the analysis of this paper.  First, owing to the
sensitivity of the results to the choice of functional forms, in any given regulatory scenario,24
empirical research will be needed to estimate the parameters of the relevant functions and, hence,
serve as a guide to regulatory action.  Second, a practical consideration which might favor the
use of ad valorem taxes ceteris paribus is that, compared to unit taxes, it is often easier to
incorporate the effects of factors such as inflation in ad valorem taxes.  Third, as far as policy
credibility is concerned, the efficacy of regulatory action depends on the properties of the stock
dependent cost function.  If production costs are unrelated to the stock of pollution, then the open
loop and the dynamically consistent solutions coincide.  As such, it makes no difference whether
the regulator announces a policy trajectory at the beginning of the game or whether he
continuously revises his policy.  Fourth, there is a basic tradeoff between policy credibility and
policy payoff.  Consistent policies yield a lower payoff than do open loop policies.  This is a
possible explanation as to why many regulators are loath to use consistent policies. 
I believe that the two most promising extensions of this line of research lie in:  (a)
generalizing the analysis to imperfectly competitive markets, and (b) analyzing the various issues
in a stochastic framework.  I have largely completed the task listed in (a) above.  The results of
that analysis are to be found in Batabyal (1995b).  I am currently at work on the task listed in (b)
above, and I hope to report the results of my research shortly. 25
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